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E-commerce between a large firm and a SME 
supplier: a screening model 
Alderete María Verónica 
Abstract—This paper derives a model of screening contracts in the presence of positive network effects when building an 
electronic commerce network (e-commerce) between a large firm and a small and medium sized enterprise (SME) supplier 
based on Compte (2008). Compte (2008) main insight is that when several potential candidates compete for the task, the 
principal will in general improve the performance of his firm by inducing the member candidates to assess their competence 
before signing the contract (through an appropriate choice of contracts).  The large firm (principal) must choose between 
different SME suppliers (agents) to build a business to business e-commerce network. In the presence of positive network 
externalities, we show that social surplus increases.    
Index Terms—Economics, Electronic Commerce, Model theory, Software acquisition.  
——————————      —————————— 
1 INTRODUCTION
Here are many types of production networks and 
some experiences show that e-commerce enforces 
network activities. The higher the relative benefits 
offered to customers and partners, the higher their incen-
tives to stick with or join the network established by the 
e-business. Following [1] the study considers that firms 
value being part of a large network, i.e. using an ICT (in-
formation and communication technology) business tool 
that many other firms also use. This is the direct network 
effect. Firms also value a hardware technology for which 
there is a wide variety of software available, and more 
software’s firms associate with a hardware technology if 
more firms use it. This is the indirect network effect. For 
example, windows operative system is widely used 
among firm’s computers, because a lot of management 
software uses windows, instead of other operative sys-
tem, as MAC.  
In the presence of network effects [2], the utility from 
adoption increases in the number of other adopters that 
purchase or introduce the innovation. Interdependence is 
a powerful source of positive feedbacks among adopters 
who take into account both the current network size and 
its perspective for future growth. Buyer supplier elec-
tronic commerce means finding a partner with which the 
firm can establish a bilateral relationship and having the 
partner undertake relationship-specific investments so 
that it becomes able to respond electronically to the firm’s 
particular needs.  
The increasing return properties inherent to network ef-
fects then magnify the relative benefits offered, thus trig-
gering positive feedback dynamics. For example, there 
are networks with a leader company, usually a large 
company that establishes the membership requirements. 
In traditional supply chain mass production oriented, as 
in the automobile industry, subcontractors are generally 
“mono clients” and network membership is relatively 
fluid. In this situation, e-commerce can reduce communi-
cation costs and critical times, without altering power 
relationships inside the network.  
This paper develops a simple principal agent model to 
explain a buyer-supplier e-commerce network building. It 
analyses the decision of a large firm about contracting an 
innovative SME supplier, to build and manage an ICT 
business tool, as electronic commerce. The suppliers are 
planning to modernize their businesses by incorporating 
ICT, but they could not do it alone, due to financial con-
straints and technical assistant support needs. Thus, con-
tracting with the large firm is the only way for a SME 
supplier to introduce an ICT business tool. Contracting 
problems between a large firm and her SME suppliers 
limit the types of contracts that can be written between 
them. The large firm search for a particular supplier part-
ner to build electronic commerce. The study finds that 
network effects related to technology compatibility as 
well as informational spillovers increase the social ex-
pected surplus. 
2 THE MODEL 
Following [3] a large firm (principal) must choose 
among different supplier firms to build a B2B electronic 
commerce network. The principal could be a large firm 
that decides to initiate electronic commerce with one of 
her suppliers. The principal has to choose among her sup-
pliers to introduce some ICT business tool for technology 
compatibility and provide them the right incentives to 
perform this task.  
Compte and Jehiel(2008) main insight is that when sev-
eral potential candidates compete for the task, the princi-
pal will in general improve the performance of his firm 
by inducing the member candidates to assess their com-
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petence before signing the contract (through an appropri-
ate choice of contracts). The manager will (at least in some 
cases) be better off when candidates can more easily as-
sess their competence, hence for example when he pro-
vides a more accurate description of the job to the agents. 
In essence, their result follows from the following ob-
servation: when several agents are in competition for the 
contract, information acquisition accompanied by a 
proper screening device is socially desirable because it 
increases the chance that the principal will pick the most 
appropriate agent. In this study, it is more likely that the 
manager will pick the most appropriate supplier firm in 
terms of technological compatibility to engage into the e-
commerce network. 
In their setup, it is not merely the fact that there are 
several agents that drives the result. It also requires that 
private information bears on agents' competence (which 
is assumed to be agent specific) rather than on common 
characteristics that would apply equally to all agents. 
Because we talk about goods that have network exter-
nalities, the utility of the agent will depend also on the 
network good. 
The large firm attaches a value of V(q) to the adoption 
of q ICT business tools. In this model, firms are supposed 
to adopt different ICT business tools. Assume that V(0)=0, 
and let V(1)=v and V(2)=V. 
Thus, q= 0, q1, q2. 
- q1=1 means the firm adopt a basic ICT business 
tool. 
- q2=2 means the firm adopt a more sophisticated 
ICT business tool. 
This ordinal output assumes that ICT business tools are 
different in quality; thus, the principal or manager at-
taches a different value to the acquisition of them.  
There are n supplier firms, all of them have planned to 
incorporate ICT business tools and the chosen one will 
incorporate these technologies as a task. For each agent i, 
the disutility of adopting an ICT business tool is equal to 
βiq, where βi>0. βi are the desutilities of technology 
adoption, each lower βi indicates that the firm candidate i 
fits the requirements better. It happens that some firms 
are more internet-oriented than others, such as a firm 
with qualified employees and entrepreneur skills that 
foster a better technology adoption.  
Because of ICT network externalities, there is an addi-
tional benefit for the supplier firm (additional to the 
monetary payment specified in a contract for non net-
work goods) that comes from the size of the network 
good qi that is defined as the total amount of network 
good in this buyer-supplier relationship, usually referred 
as network size. Then, qi is at the same time the total 
amount of the network good the supplier firm consumes.  
Utility is transferable. If qi ICT tools are introduced and 
the principal pays t to agent i, the payoff to the principal 
is V(q)−t and the net benefit to agent i is t−(βi-γ)q, where 
γ is a parameter that reflects the preferences of the sup-
plier over the network good. Thus, the net benefit of the 
agent depends negatively on the disutility of technology 
adoption and positively on the utility of the network 
good. 
The parameters of the problem are known to all parties, 
except for the desutilities of production, β1,……,βn; and 
the utilities of the network good γ1,……γn, which are 
supposed to be identical among agents. We assume that 
each βi can take two possible values, βi { } ββββ <<∈ 0,, and we assume that these parameters 
are drawn from identical and independent distributions. 
We let p denote the probability that firm i is a low cost 
agent: p=Pr{βi= β }and (1-p) the probability of being a 
high cost agent and assume that 0<p<1. 
The social surplus is equal to S=V(qi) –( βi-γi)qi 
Following [3] assume that for a low cost agent, the so-
cial surplus is largest when a sophisticated ICT tool is 
adopted, and that for a high cost agent, the social surplus 
is largest when a basic ICT tool is adopted, that is: 
For β , S = V-2( )γβ −  
If V-2 )( γβ − > v-( )γβ − , then V-v> )( γβ −  
For β , S = v- )( γβ −  
If v- )( γβ − > V-2 )( γβ − , then )( γβ − >V-v 
As a result, )( γβ − <V-v< )( γβ − or β < V-v+γ< β .  
 
These conditions are equivalent to 
 { } { }0),(2max)(,0),(max)(2 γβγβγβγβ −−>−−−−>−− VvandvV   
 
After signing a contract, the supplier firm will learn at 
no cost if he is high cost or low cost. In this setting, if the 
firm observes β immediately after being offered a contract 
(but yet not signed) it will be at positive cost (c>0) reflect-
ing the difference in cost between acquiring information 
in the precontractual and postcontractual phases, the 
weight of the principal assistance over the cost of acquir-
ing firm type information. 
The objective of the paper is to expand Compte’s results 
in a network effects setting, to show if these network ef-
fects alters the decision of the principal about offering 
contracts that induce information acquisition.  
 
2.1. Results 
Following [3], consider the case in which the principal 
would induce no information acquisition. In this case, 
candidates are identical ex ante. Thus, it is irrelevant 
which one is selected (preferences over the network good 
are identical). The maximum surplus S generated by any 
match is then obtained when the firm adopts a more so-
phisticated ICT business tool if low cost and a basic one if 
high cost. Then,  
 
))()(1())(2(* γβγβ −−−+−−= vpVpS                (1) 
 
Compared to the maximum surplus S obtained in a non 
network goods setting (γ=0), this one is increased by the 
amount )1( p+γ . It can be demonstrated that 
S*=S+ )1( p+γ . Thus, the higher the probability of being a 
JOURNAL OF COMPUTING, VOLUME 1, ISSUE 1, DECEMBER 2009, ISSN: 2151-9617 
HTTPS://SITES.GOOGLE.COM/SITE/JOURNALOFCOMPUTING/  
 
160
low cost agent is, the larger the expected surplus will be. 
Besides, the higher the network good utility is, the larger 
the expected surplus will be. 
Since the agents have the option to refuse any contrac-
tual offer, they cannot obtain an expected payoff below 0. 
Thus, S* is an upper bound on the payoff obtained by the 
principal when he does not induce information acquisi-
tion.  
 
Proposition I. The expected payoff obtained by the principal if 
he does not induce information acquisition is at most equal 
to S*. 
 
According to [4], the payoff obtained by the principal 
will be strictly smaller than S*, because of the incentives 
she has to give agents not to acquiring information before 
signing the contract. 
Then, [3] turn to the case in which the principal induces 
information acquisition. It is assumed that the principal 
makes a sequence of contractual offers to agent 1, 2, …, n, 
until one agent accepts.  
In this study Proposition 2 generates the same results as 
in the case of non network goods, the agent prefers ac-
quiring information. The only difference is the payoff to 
specify in the contract C1, which must add the network 
externality.  
 
Proposition II. Assume that the principal always offers the 
contract C, defined as follows: “Introduce a sophisticated ICT 
tool and receive a transfer equal to T= pc /)(2 ++− γβ .” 
There exists c’>0 such that if c<c’, then (a) any agent who is 
offered this contract acquires information and accepts the con-
tract if and only if he is a low cost agent, and (b) expected pay-
off to the principal exceeds S* if n is large enough and γ>0. 
 
Proof. The presence of network effects introduces an 
additional constraint for the principal’s expected payoff 
to be larger than the expected surplus (n large is not a 
sufficient condition). 
To prove proposition II, observe that a high cost agent 
will not accept the contract, since T< pc /)(2 +− γβ . 
If the agent does not acquire information about his type 
and still signs the contract he gets T-2(Eβ-γ) which is 
negative for c small enough.1 Look at the appendix to get 
this expression.  
Following [3] the principal’s expected payoff is equal to 
 
))()1(1( TVp n −−−                                                         (2) 
 
Which exceeds S* when n is large enough and c small 
enough and if the principal internalizes the externality. 
))()1(1( TVp n −−− converges to )(2 γβ−−V as 0, →∞→ cn  and 
because S*< )(2 γβ −−V , since γ>> ( β−v )-( β2−V ). The 
right side of this inequality is negative since 
 
1 For c <c’= γββ ppp 2))(1(2 −−−  
β2−V > β−v .  
To prove that S*< )(2 γβ −−V assume 
)(2 γβ −−V = ))()(1())(2(* γβγβ −−−+−−= vpVpS  
)(2 γβ −−V = )1())(1()2( pvpVp ++−−+− γββ . 
Rearranging this expression we get γ=( β−v )-( β2−V ). 
This can not be true since γ>0, the agent value the net-
work good positevely. Following the same reasoning, γ< 
( β−v )-( β2−V ) is not possible. Then, γ>( β−v )-
( β2−V )and )(2 γβ−−V > ))()(1())(2(* γβγβ −−−+−−= vpVpS . 
 
Second Best 
 
Proposition II shows that inducing some information 
acquisition is good for the principal. To get the optimal 
contract, the network externalities are introduced, so that 
the expected payoff obtained by the principal under the 
optimal contract is function of the information acquisition 
and the network externality. 
Following [3] we define candc *, let 
)](()(2)[1(*))(1(c γβγβββ −−−−−−=−−= vVppcandpp an
d observe that c *= ))(()(2)(1( γβγβ −−−−−− vVpp  can be 
written as  ))(2)(1( γββ +−−−− vVpp  which is positive 
since we have proved that γ>( β−v )-( β2−V ) 
and vVascc >−< β* .  
Define a new contract C2 as follows: “Either introduce a 
basic ICT tool for a transfer t=Eβ-γ, or a sophisticated ICT 
tool for a transfer T= t+ )( εβ + . 
 
Proposition III. Assume that *),( ccc∈ , n=2 and their defini-
tions of *candc . The optimal contract can be implemented by 
offering C1 to agent 1 and contract C2 to agent 2 in case agent 
1 rejects C1. The optimal contract yields to the principal an 
expected payoff equal to S*+ cc −*  
 
 Proof . 
Step 1: The principal cannot get more than ** cS + -c 
The best economic outcome is that when one of the two 
agents has a low cost he is selected to adopt two im-
provements and otherwise adopt one. The first event has 
probability p+(1-p)p, and if the agent acquires informa-
tion, then the corresponding expected surplus is given by:  
)]([)1()](2][)1([ 2 γβγβ −−−+−−−+ vpVppp = 
**]1)1([)()1()2]()1([ 2 cSpppvpVppp +=+−++−−+−−+ γββ (See 
appendix). Where S* is the highest surplus obtained with 
one agent or without information acquisition.  
 
When one agent acquires information the maximum 
surplus net of information acquisition costs is thus equal 
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to ** cS + -c, which is the maximun expected payoff the 
principal can hope to get. 
 
Step 2.  
When *),( ccc∈ , the contract C2 yields the principal an 
expected payoff equal to S*. 
Proof. By construction we have: 
)()(2 γβγβ −−>−− tT  and )()(2 γβγβ −−<−− tT . This 
means γβγβ −<−<− tT . 
Hence an agent who would accept this contract without 
acquiring information would introduce two contents if 
low cost, and one content if high cost. Then, he would 
obtain an expected payoff G supplier that satisfies  
 
G supplier= ))()(1())(2( γβγβ −−−+−− tpTp   (3) 
 
This is positive by construction. Besides, for c> *c , we 
have Eβ> pc −− 1/β . Hence we have t> pc −− 1/β , so 
we also have G supplier > cTp −−− ))(2( γβ . 
 
Step 3. When the principal offers contracts as in propo-
sition III he obtains an expected payoff equal to ** cS + -c. 
Proof. When the principal offers C1 to agent 1, agent 1 
acquires information and rejetcs the contract in the event 
he is a high cost agent. In the latter case, he offers C2 to 
agent 2, and obtains an expected payoff equal to S. Over-
all, his expected payoff is equal to  
 
G principal= *)1()( SpTVp −+−  
G principal= *)1())(2( SpcVp −+−−− γβ  
Since *c = *))(2( SVp −−− γβ , cpSVp +=−− *))(2( γβ  
G principal= *)1(* SpccpS −+−+ = ccS −+ **   (4) 
3 CONCLUSION 
In this model, the principal is planning building elec-
tronic commerce with some of her business partners. 
Thus, the contracted supplier’s task consists in the 
adoption of some ICT business tool. For instance, the 
firm can incorporate to its website the ability to buy by 
mail order or additionally to accept online payments 
through an automated process.  
The results of the paper follow directly from [2]. 
Once network effects are introduced to the model, 
agent’s desutility reduces leading to an increase in so-
cial surplus. 
 
APPENDICES  
Proof proposition II: 
))(2)(1())(2( γβγβ −−−+−− TpTp  
= )(2))((2 γβγβγβ −−−−−− pT  
= ))()()((2 γβγβγβ −+−−−− ppT  
= )(2))(1()((2 γβγβγβ −−=−−+−− ETppT  
 
Proof Footnote 1: 
 
)(2 γβ −= ET  
Low cost agent’s benefit= βγβββ 22))1((22 −−−+=− ppT  
γβββ 2))(1(22 −−−=− pT  
 
From proposition II’s contract, c=p(T-Desutility). Then 
 c’=p(T-2 β ), c’= ppp γββ 2))(1(2 −−− . 
 
Proof proposition III:  
 
=+−++−−+−−+ ]1)1([)()1()2]()1([ 2 pppvpVppp γββ  
=+−++−−+−−+ ]1)1([)()1()2]()1([ 2 pppvpVppp γββ
=−+++−−+−+−−+− pppvpppVppVp )1()1()])()1([1()2()1()2( γγβββ
=−+++−−−−−+−−+− pppvpppvVppVp )1()1()()1()1)(()2()1()2( γγββββ
)1()1())(2()1())(1()2( pppvVppvpVp −+++−−−−+−−+− γγββββ
= ** cS +  
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